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Résumé : Dans les études historiques contemporaines, les contributions de
Peano sont généralement envisagées dans le cadre de la tradition logiciste
initiée par Frege. Dans cet article, je vais d’abord démontrer que Frege et Peano
ont développé de manière indépendante des approches semblables visant à
s’appuyer sur la logique pour exprimer rigoureusement des lois mathématiques
et les prouver. Ensuite, je soutiendrai cependant que Peano a également utilisé
sa logique mathématique d’une manière qui anticipait la formalisation des
théories mathématiques, laquelle est incompatible avec la conception de la
logique défendue par Frege.
Abstract: In contemporary historical studies, Peano is usually included in the
logical tradition pioneered by Frege. In this paper, I shall first demonstrate
that Frege and Peano independently developed a similar way of using logic
for the rigorous expression and proof of mathematical laws. However, I shall
then suggest that Peano also used his mathematical logic in such a way that
anticipated a formalisation of mathematical theories which was incompatible
with Frege’s conception of logic.
1 Introduction
Even by the early twentieth-century, in Jourdain’s Preface to the English
translation of Couturat’s L’Algèbre de la Logique [Jourdain 1914, viii], Frege
and Peano had been presented as members of the same logical tradition. The
alleged proximity of the views of Frege and Peano, purportedly synthesised by
Russell, has been retained in the contemporary historiography of logic and has
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become a commonplace.1 Frege’s and Peano’s conceptions of logic stand out
in opposition to the algebra of logic tradition.
In this paper I shall question Peano’s inclusion in the Frege-Russell
tradition on the basis that Peano develops a specific application of logic to
mathematics that is incompatible with Frege’s view. First, I shall argue
that Frege intends to use the logical system developed in his mature works
not only to show that arithmetic can be reduced to logic but also as a tool
for the rigorous expression and proof of mathematical laws. Second, I shall
propose that although Peano devises a reformulation of mathematical theories
by means of logic similar to Frege’s, in addition, Peano and the members
of the so-called Peano school develop a new understanding of the resulting
expressions of this reformulation that anticipates a contemporary notion of
formalisation which Frege cannot accept.2 In sum, I shall investigate Frege’s
and Peano’s views on the application of logic to mathematical theories and
the formalisation of the latter, and conclude that they develop accounts that
are, in significant respects, irreconcilable.
This paper is in two parts. First, I shall discuss Frege’s views on the
application of logic to arithmetic. This involves his logicist project but
also, and crucially, his proposal to apply the formal resources of logic to a
reformulation of mathematical theories. Second, I shall study, on the one
hand, Peano’s aim of creating an ideography by means of the combination of
logical and mathematical symbols and, on the other, the development by the
members of Peano’s school of a new understanding of the expressions of such
an ideography in the context of proofs of independence.
2 Frege’s reduction and symbolisation
2.1 Logicism and the reduction of arithmetic
For a significant stretch of his career, Frege understood the relationship
between arithmetic and logic as the reduction of the former to the latter.
The purpose of Frege’s logicist project is to demonstrate that arithmetic is
a logical theory. In Grundlagen der Arithmetik [Frege 1884], Frege considers
1. Van Heijenoort develops Jourdain’s dichotomy of two logical traditions in
terms of the “logic as language” tradition and the “logic as calculus” tradition [van
Heijenoort 1967b]. This paper became very influential and established a conceptual
framework for the history of modern logic.
2. In the context of this paper, I understand by “formalisation” the replacement
of a set of sentences expressed in a language L (usually, natural language) with a
corresponding set of sentences expressed in a formal language L′ (typically, that of
first-order logic), which preserves the logical form of the sentences of L and expresses it
using logical symbols, but substitutes non-logical constants (which are uninterpreted)
for the non-logical terms of L. On the notion of formal language, see [Church 1956,
2–68].
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the logicist project from a philosophical point of view and tries to informally
justify that the reduction can be carried out. He then attempts a formal proof
of the reduction of arithmetic to logic in Grundgesetze der Arithmetik [Frege
1893, 1903, hereinafter, Grundgesetze].
One of the objectives of the logicist project is the explicit definition of the
basic notions of arithmetic by means of the logical symbols. This requires
the development of a logical language with enough expressive power. In order
to achieve this goal, in Grundgesetze Frege profoundly modifies the concept-
script—the logical system he had first presented in Begriffsschrift, eine der
arithmetischen Formelsprache des reinen Denkens [Frege 1879a, hereinafter,
Begriffsschrift]. Among other things, in Grundgesetze he rigidly regiments
quantification and incorporates the notion of value-range in the language by
means of a function symbol, “–εϕ(ε)”.
Frege’s logicist project also aims to prove that all arithmetical laws are
logical laws, i.e., to prove that the laws of arithmetic can be derived in
the calculus of the concept-script from logical laws and explicit definitions.
Such a proof involves a modification of the semantical status of some of
the components of arithmetical propositions; the letters occurring in them
then go on to express generality over the domain of logical objects and,
accordingly, the quantifiers cease to range exclusively over natural numbers.
Therefore, after the reduction of arithmetic to the concept-script, arithmeti-
cal laws can still be interpreted judgements, although they would go on
to express purely logical facts.
Moreover, after the explicit definition of the basic notions of arithmetic, for
Frege there is no need to keep the symbols that represent them in the process
of proving arithmetical laws by logical means. The proofs and judgements
of the first volume of Grundgesetze do not contain arithmetical symbols, but
the primitive symbols of the concept-script, letters and symbols that Frege
introduces by means of definitions, such as “0” and “1”—which refer to the
cardinal numbers 0 and 1, respectively.
All in all, the reduction of a theory to another is significantly different from
the formalisation of a theory. A formalisation requires a formal language or,
at least, a symbolic language that contains non-logical constants. Since non-
logical constants are uninterpreted, the resulting formulas of a formalisation
do not preserve the meaning of the formalised sentences; only the syntactic
status of the symbols of the formalised theory is kept. In contrast, a reduction
does not require a formal language; in fact, it can only be performed by means
of an interpreted language, since the original meaning of both the primitive
symbols and the laws of the reduced theory have to be maintained in essence.
In fact, the basic terms of the theory by means of which the reduction is
performed are substantive, in the sense that they refer to the specific entities
the theory is about.3 This enables the provision of explicit definitions of the
3. I take the notion of substantive basic terms and their role in the reduction of a
mathematical theory from [Klev 2011].
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basic notions of the reduced theory and the preservation of their properties.
For instance, in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to the concept-script, the
cardinal numbers are defined as logical objects, but at the same time they
retain their mathematical properties.
2.2 Early and late applications of logic
As is well known, Frege’s logicist project ended abruptly with the discovery
of the inconsistency of the concept-script presented in Grundgesetze. After
1902, Frege was forced to modify his views on the relation between logic
and arithmetic. The best witness to Frege’s post-logicist understanding of
the relationship between the concept-script and mathematics can be found
in the student notes Carnap wrote while attending some of Frege’s courses
in Jena between 1910 and 1913 [Frege 1996]. In the first of these courses,
Begriffsschrift I (which took place in the winter semester of 1910-1911), Frege
presents the main components of the language of the concept-script—as they
are described in Grundgesetze, but without mentioning the symbols for value-
ranges or for the function Kξ. He thus obtains a higher-order logical language.
Frege then shows, with examples, how its syntax could be naturally adapted
to the expressions of arithmetic. This process consists in connecting atomic
expressions of number theory, such as “a > 0” or “(a− b) + b = a”, using the
logical symbols of the concept-script. The combination of atomic expressions
of number theory and logical symbols also involves the incorporation of the
letters of the concept-script—by means of which generality is expressed—into
the aforementioned atomic expressions. For instance:4
If we want to express that at most one object falls under a concept,
we write:
a d a = d
ϕ(d)
ϕ(a)
e.g., [the concept] positive square root of 1: ξ2 = 1
ξ > 0





[Frege 1996, 17; 77]
4. When an English translation is quoted, two page numbers—separated with a
semicolon—are given: the first corresponds to the most recent edition of the source
listed and the second to the English translation. When no English translation is
available, quotes and page numbers are taken from the most recent edition of the
source and translated by the author.
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In the second course, Begriffsschrift II (which took place in the summer
semester of 1913), Frege first presents the logical fragment of the calculus of
the Grundgesetze concept-script: he introduces the basic laws and some of
its inference rules, but omits basic laws (V) and (VI), which involve value-
ranges.5 Frege then exemplifies how the calculus of the concept-script can
be applied to prove two theorems of analysis. These proofs are detailed
reconstructions of mathematical proofs using the formal tools provided by
the concept-script. First, Frege reformulates the theorem he wants to justify
using a combination of logical and mathematical symbols. Second, he lists
and reformulates in the explained way the propositions of analysis that are
needed in the proof as premises. Third, the logical principles that are required
in the proof are incorporated as premises by means of substitutions, in such
a way that simple formulas belonging to the language of the concept-script,
such as “Mβ(f(β))” or “f(a)” (which, strictly speaking, should be considered
terms) are replaced with expressions of analysis. With all these components,
Frege conducts the proof in a similar way as he had done in Grundgesetze: he
renders explicit all the logical principles and formal steps involved, using the
inference rules available.
Frege’s methodology and goals in these courses coincides with the appli-
cation of the concept-script he devised during the immediate years after the
publication of Begriffsschrift, in the papers “Anwendungen der Begriffsschrift”,
“Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift” and “Über den Zweck der
Begriffsschrift” [Frege 1879b, 1880-1881, 1882]. In these papers he is explicit
about the aim of such a combination of the concept-script with a scientific
theory: Frege strongly associates it with the rigorous expression of the laws
and proofs of such a theory. He rejects the perspective of producing what
he calls an “abstract logic”, i.e., a symbolism isolated from the expression of
specific meaning. As he says in “Über den Zweck der Begriffsschrift”, in which
he compares the 1879 concept-script with Boolean logic, “I did not wish to
present an abstract logic in formulas, but to express a content through written
symbols in a more precise and perspicuous way than is possible with words”
[Frege 1882, 97; 90–91]. Also in this paper Frege offers a general overview of
how he intends to apply his concept-script to arithmetic:
Now I have attempted to supplement the formula language of
arithmetic with symbols for the logical relations in order to
5. There is no mention of basic law (IV) in the student notes. However, this basic
law belongs to the propositional fragment of the concept-script and is completely
unrelated to the notion of value-range. In the notes, right before basic law (III) is
introduced by Frege, several pages are empty—which indicates that Carnap missed
some lectures or failed to take notes in them. Either Frege mentioned basic law (IV)
during the course and Carnap did not record it or Frege considered that this basic
law was unnecessary for his purposes in this course and did not mention it.
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produce—at first just for arithmetic—a concept-script6 of the
kind I have presented as desirable. This does not rule out the
application of my symbols to other fields. The logical relations
occur everywhere, and the symbols for particular contents can be
so chosen that they fit the framework of the concept-script. [Frege
1882, 113–114; 89]
Frege’s view in this passage coincides with the use of the concept-script
described in the 1910-1913 courses—that of a formal structure that could be
combined with the atomic expressions of mathematical theories in such a way
that the meaning of the laws of these theories could be expressed in a precise
way and their proofs could be conducted with the standards of rigour of the
concept-script.7
2.3 Frege’s symbolisation
The application of the concept-script which Frege proposes both in his 1879-
1882 papers and in the post-Grundgesetze courses departs from a formalisation.
For the sake of clarity, I shall refer to Frege’s proposed application of the
concept-script to a scientific theory as “symbolisation”, although he never used
this term in this sense.
Frege wants to preserve the symbols of arithmetic and use them as
canonical names, i.e., as symbols with a specific and fixed meaning. Even
quantification is restricted in this application; in the examples in the student
notes, all letters are supposed to range over real numbers, since the numerical







This [c > a and d > b] is supposed to mean that a and b are
real numbers, since it is only for them that > is supposed to be
defined. [Frege 1996, 26; 100]
6. For the sake of terminological homogeneity, I have replaced “concep-
tual notation” with “concept-script” as the English counterpart of the German
“Begriffsschrift” in this quote, taken from Bynum’s translation of [Frege 1882].
7. Frege’s position regarding the application of the concept-script to the rigoriza-
tion of mathematical theories is related to his project of creating a lingua characterica.
This latter notion can be connected to Leibniz’s ideal of a scientific language. The
choice of the term “concept-script” [Begriffsschrift] is also related to this project.
On Frege’s notion of lingua characterica and its relation to the concept-script, see
[Bertran-San Millán 2020a]. See also [Patzig 1969], [Kluge 1977], [Peckhaus 2004]
and [Korte 2010].
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Note that Frege shows no difficulty in restricting the domain of the letters
or the applicability of arithmetical relations. In this context, if the letters “a”
and “c” were to have a domain wider than the set of the real numbers, then
it would not be possible to determine the meaning of an expression such as
“c > a”, since the relation > is, as Frege acknowledges, only defined for real
numbers as arguments.
The symbols of number theory used in this application are not employed
by Frege to express abstract properties and relations. They are not, therefore,
seen as uninterpreted non-logical constants devoid of meaning. Only the letters
have a specific domain, determined by the intended application.
By means of a symbolisation, Frege aims to overcome the lack of precision
posed by the use of natural language in the definition of the derived concepts
of mathematical theories and in their proofs. These theories do not have
the expressive means necessary for the symbolic representation of the logical
relations that form complex sentences. At the same time, most derived notions
are defined in complex sentences. As a consequence, the derived notions,
if defined at all, have to be defined using natural language, by means of
which it is not possible to attain the level of exactness and rigour Frege
requires for mathematics. Likewise, in “Booles rechnende Logik und die
Begriffsschrift”, while comparing his concept-script with Boolean logic, Frege
states the following:
[The concept-script] is in a position to represent the formation
of the concepts actually needed in science, in contrast to the
relatively sterile multiplicative and additive combinations we find
in Boole. [Frege 1880-1881, 52; 46]
By 1910-1913 Frege’s remark on the poor expressive capabilities of Boolean
logic had to be qualified. By then, the proponents of the algebra of
logic had overcome all the expressive shortcomings they had faced in 1880.
However, in the 1910–1913 courses, Frege retains unmodified his claim that the
language of mathematical theories needs to be complemented with the formal
resources of the concept-script if their new concepts are to be defined with
an adequate standard of rigour. In these courses, Frege even appeals to the
same examples as those of “Booles rechnende Logik und die Begriffsschrift”
[Frege 1880-1881]—namely, the definition of the notion of the continuity of
a function—in order to show the fruitfulness of his symbolisation in the
processes of concept formation.
In fact, by applying the formal resources of the concept-script to a scientific
theory such as analysis, Frege shows a lack of interest in logic as a subject
matter. He takes great pains to carefully show how a proof of a theorem
of analysis can be performed using the formal resources of the concept-
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script,8 but there is absolutely no evidence in the 1879-1883 papers or in
the 1910-1913 courses to show that by symbolising analysis or arithmetic in
the way he does, he intends to answer metatheoretical questions such as the
completeness or consistency of these theories, or the independence of their
axioms. The focus is put on precision and rigour. In “Booles rechnende
Logik und die Begriffsschrift’, after a full symbolisation of the proof of an
arithmetical theorem [Frege 1880-1881, 30–36; 27–32]—analogous to those
performed in Begriffsschrift II [Frege 1996, 25–37; 98–119]—Frege lists the
demands fulfilled by such a symbolisation: a complete and clear specification of
all the principles necessary for the derivation of the theorem; a warrant that the
proof contains no appeal to intuition; and, finally, the certainty that there are
no formal steps missing in the proof, since all of them have been rendered
explicit [Frege 1880-1881, 36; 32].
3 Peano’s symbolisation and formalisation
3.1 Peano’s ideography
One of the most prominent elements in Peano’s development of his logic,
which he calls “mathematical logic”, is the construction of a logical symbolism
that can be used as a tool for the rigorous expression of the laws of scientific
theories as well as for helping making explicit the logical principles involved
in their proofs. Even in Peano’s first uses of his logical symbolism, rigour in
the derivation of theorems and a precise characterisation of scientific terms
are already established as the main goals of this reformulation of scientific
theories. In his seminal Arithmetices principia nova methodo exposita [Peano
1889a, hereinafter, Arithmetices principia], Peano expresses himself thus:9
With this notation every proposition assumes the form and
precision equations enjoy in algebra, and from propositions so
written others may be deduced, by a process which resembles the
solution of algebraic equations. That is the chief reason for writing
this paper.
[...] Those arithmetical signs which may be expressed using
others along with signs of logic represent the ideas we can define.
8. More than a third of the pages that correspond to Carnap’s notes on
Begriffsschrift II are devoted to the proof of a single theorem. See [Frege 1996,
29–37; 103–119].
9. In Principii di Geometria logicamente esposti [Peano 1889b, hereinafter,
Principii di Geometria], Peano discusses several axioms of Pasch’s axiomatisation
of geometry—which are formulated in natural language—and contrasts them with
his own axioms—which are symbolised [Peano 1889b, 84–85]. In this discussion he
highlights the ambiguities involved in the expression of mathematical laws by means
of natural language.
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Thus I have defined every sign, if you except the four which are
contained in the explanations of § 1. [Peano 1889a, 21; 102]
As we shall see, Peano’s intended use of mathematical logic can be seen
as what I called a symbolisation. In this sense, he shares Frege’s view on the
combination of logic and scientific theories for the construction of a symbolised
reformulation of these theories.10
Still, Peano’s understanding of a symbolisation cannot be reduced to a
mere rewriting of sentences in the natural language by means of which the laws
of scientific theories are expressed. He produces what he calls “ideography”
and thus connects it—just as Frege had done via Trendelenburg’s use of the
term “Begriffsschrift” [Trendelenburg 1856]—with Leibniz’s scientific ideal of
a characteristica universalis, which is not intended to express uttered sounds
but to represent the structure of concepts.11
In Notations de logique mathématique, Peano reflects on the creation of
an ideography. He describes a similar process to Frege’s symbolisation [Peano
1894b]. As a first step, Peano proposes to extract the logical form of the
sentences of a given theory and to express it using the logical symbols. He
then suggests an analysis of the terms of the theory, by means of which its
primitive terms can be located and their connection with the other terms can
be discovered. This last step makes it clear that Peano does not intend to
perform a mere rewriting of the theory.12 In his words:
Any theory can be reduced to symbols, for every spoken
language, and every writing, is a symbolism, or a series of
signs that represent ideas. In order to apply the signs we have
explained, we can take the propositions of the theory in question,
written in ordinary language, and replace the word is with the
signs ε , =, C, as the case may be, and [put] instead of and, or,
10. Since Frege first developed his approach to the symbolisation of mathematical
theories as early as 1879, it might be asked whether he influenced Peano’s notion
of symbolisation using mathematical logic. It is very unlikely. Peano’s first
symbolisation was presented in Arithmetices principia, published in 1889, while—
as Nidditch [Nidditch 1963, 105] states—he first refers to Frege in [Peano 1891a, 101,
note 5; 155, fn. 5]. Prior to 1891, Peano had published other papers in which he
symbolised mathematical theories: [Peano 1889b, 1890a,b]. More importantly, Frege
articulates in full the application of the concept-script to logic in [Frege 1880-1881];
however, he attempted three times but failed to publish this paper, so probably
Peano never had access to it. The extant correspondence between Frege and Peano
started in 1891—no trace of any previous letter can be found—and there Frege neither
mentions any of his 1879-1882 papers nor explains how he conceives the application
of the concept-script to mathematical theories.
11. As Barnes argues, the term “Begriffsschrift” can be translated as “ideography”
[Barnes 2002]. On the relation between Peano and Leibniz’s scientific ideal, see [Cantù
2014].
12. See also [Peano 1896–1897, 203, 191], where Peano distinguishes between a
symbolisation—by means of an ideography—and a mere rewriting.
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. . . the signs ∩, ∪, . . . ; and that cum granu salis, because we saw
for instance that, depending on the position, the conjunction and
is represented by means of ∩ or ∪.
After this first transformation, the propositions are expressed
in a few words, linked by the logical signs ∩, ∪, =, C, etc.; and
if it has been well done, the words that remain are devoid of any
grammatical form; for all the relations of grammar are expressed
by means of the signs of logic. These words represent the proper
ideas of the theory being studied. Then the ideas represented by
these words are analysed, the composed ideas are decomposed into
the simple parts, and only, after a long series of reductions and
transformations, one obtains a small group of words, which can
be considered as minimum, by means of which, combined with the
signs of logic, all the ideas and propositions of the science under
study can be expressed. [Peano 1894b, 164, my translation]
With this ideography, i.e., with the combination of mathematical logic and
the primitive terms of the language of scientific theories, Peano can eliminate
all traces of natural language in the formulation of these theories. Since their
primitive terms are preserved, the original meaning of the expressions of these
theories is also kept.
Peano refers to his symbolisation of scientific theories as a reduction.
However, he does not intend to define the primitive notions of a theory in
terms of another (in this case, mathematical logic), nor prove that the axioms
of the former are, in fact, theorems of the latter. In this sense, Peano’s notion
of reduction does not correspond to the characterisation of Frege’s reduction
of arithmetic to the concept-script provided in Section 2.1.13
Peano focusses on the ideographic reformulations of mathematical theories.
With the axiomatic method in mind, he produces several symbolic axiomati-
sations of arithmetic and geometry.14 The resulting theories are constituted
by two separate groups of axioms: a set of logical principles (which usually
13. Neither did Frege see Peano’s symbolisation as a reduction, see [Frege 1897,
365–366; 237]. Although there has been a debate in the literature, some consensus
has arisen over the thesis that Peano did not endorse Frege’s logicist project. Most
historical studies plainly deny that Peano was a logicist (see [Kennedy 1963, 264],
[Segre 1995], [Lolli 2011]), while others also emphasise his rejection of philosophical
discussions see [Geymonat 1955]. See also [Grattan-Guinness 2000, 247–249].
14. Having presented the first formulation of his mathematical logic in Arithmetices
principia, during the early 1890s Peano provides multiple examples of the ideographic
formulations of mathematical theories: analysis, see, for instance [Peano 1890b,
1892b]; geometry, see [Peano 1889b, 1894a]; arithmetic, see, for instance, [Peano
1891d]; and even Euclid’s Elements, see [Peano 1890a, 1891b, 1892a]. Peano’s major
ideographic endeavour is his collective project of a Formulaire de mathématiques,
which was published in several volumes and revised in subsequent editions. On this
project, see [Borga, Freguglia et al. 1985, 163–170] and [Roero 2011].
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includes principles of the logic of classes) and a set of mathematical axioms.15
The clear separation of the logical and the mathematical constituents of the
theory is shared with Frege.
Moreover, Peano’s presentation of the language of a symbolised mathemat-
ical theory also preserves this distinction. Peano consistently provides specific
lists for logical (and class-theoretical) and mathematical symbols and treats
the latter as substantive, as canonical names.16 In this regard, later in 1897
he expresses the convenience of preserving the symbols of arithmetic:
The symbols of Algebra allow us to express some propositions:
2 + 3 = 5, 5 < 7, . . .
We keep these symbols; sometimes we even generalise their
meaning; but when we encounter ideas that cannot be expressed
by the symbols of Algebra, we introduce new symbols. For
instance, we want to express the proposition
7 is a prime number;
we already have a symbol to indicate the subject 7; we introduce a
symbol Np to signify “prime number”; and a symbol ε to indicate
“is a”; then the stated proposition is transformed into
7 εNp.
[Peano 1897, 241, my translation]
Peano is aware that the expression of mathematical principles and the
definition of derived notions require, besides the use of logical symbols and
symbols of the calculus of classes, the enlargement of the set of primitive
symbols. For instance, he introduces “N” and “Np” to refer to the class of
natural numbers and the class of prime numbers, respectively. These new
symbols should also be taken as canonical names, although they do not belong
to the language of arithmetic stricto sensu. After all, Peano includes them in
the list of primitive symbols of his symbolisation of arithmetic and assumes
that they express basic properties of numbers that have been left undefined.
By the end of the nineteenth century, geometry lacked a symbolic language
like that of arithmetic. In this sense, Peano’s symbolisation of geometry could
15. This claim should be qualified if the earliest formulations of Peano’s mathe-
matical logic are considered. Peano does not axiomatise the logical component of his
axiomatisation of arithmetic presented in Arithmetices principia. He first offers an
axiomatic presentation of the calculus of propositions in [Peano 1891c]. Moreover,
in Principii di Geometria the logical principles are not explicit. In this work Peano
only includes three axioms that involve equality [Peano 1889b, 61].
16. See, for instance, his presentation in Arithmetices principia [Peano 1889a, 23;
103–104]. On Peano’s view regarding the substantivity of the primitive notions of
geometry and arithmetic, see [Borga, Freguglia et al. 1985, 51–54, 88–94, 109–110].
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not preserve established geometrical symbols that were already in use: the
list of primitive symbols of geometry had to be created anew. In Principii
di Geometria, adopting “1” and “ ε ” as primitive symbols, and using the
symbols of the language of his mathematical logic introduced in Arithmetices
principia, Peano offers a symbolisation of geometry and presents the theory
axiomatically. He thus employs a mixture of logical symbols, arithmetical
symbols and symbols of the calculus of classes and assigns the latter two
a geometrical meaning (sometimes preserving, for certain applications, their
original meaning). For instance, “1” is used to refer to the class of points
and “ ε ” to the relation between a point and a segment [Peano 1889b, 59–61].
However, at the same time, Peano would express that the objects a and b are
points by “a, b ε 1”, where “ ε ” is used as the symbol for membership.
3.2 Formal understanding of symbolised theories
Almost simultaneously to his work on the symbolisation of mathematical
theories, Peano developed a new understanding of symbolised expressions
that was intimately connected with the evaluation of the independence of
the axioms of these theories. As we shall see below, this new understanding
of symbolised mathematical axioms in the context of proofs of independence
anticipates in significant ways a formalisation.
Peano does not explain in detail the nature of this new understanding of
symbolised mathematical laws. However, some members of the Peano school
offer lengthy accounts that are related to their explanation of the resolution
of metamathematical questions such as the independence of the axioms or the
primitive notions of mathematical theories. These accounts can shed light on
Peano’s position.
A fundamental element for the understanding of a symbolised mathemat-
ical theory in Peano’s school is the stratification of the components of this
theory. In Arithmetices principia, Peano distinguishes between the axioms
and the theorems of arithmetic, and also between its defined and undefined
symbols:
Those arithmetical signs which may be expressed by using
others along with signs of logic represent the ideas that we can
define. Thus I have defined every sign, if you except the four
which are contained in the explanations of § 1 [N, 1, +1, =].
If, as I believe, these cannot be reduced further, then the ideas
expressed by them may not be defined by ideas already supposed
to be known.
Propositions which are deduced from others by the operations
of logic are theorems; those for which this is not true I have
called axioms. There are nine axioms here (§ 1), and they express
fundamental properties of the undefined signs.
[Peano 1889a, 21; 102]
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In “Formole di Logica Matematica” [Peano 1891c, 102–104] Peano
rephrases this double distinction in terms of primitive and derived propositions
and symbols. Primitive propositions, or axioms, are left unproved and
primitive symbols are not defined. By means of definitions in terms of
primitive symbols all derived notions can be obtained, and theorems (i.e.,
derived propositions) are the result of derivations that start from primitive
propositions and definitions. This idea refines Peano’s view on the process of
the creation of an ideography.
From this conceptual framework, Padoa characterises in “Essai d’une
théorie algébrique des nombres entiers, précédé d’une introduction logique
à une théorie déductive quelconque” [Padoa 1901] what he calls a “deductive
theory”. The components of a deductive theory are expressed in a language
constituted by a system of primitive symbols (which Padoa calls “undefined
symbols”), while the theory is determined by a system of primitive propositions
(“unproved propositions” in Padoa’s terminology). The deductive approach is
defined by the disentanglement of these systems of symbols and propositions
from their original meaning:
[D]uring the period of elaboration of any deductive theory we
choose the ideas to be represented by the undefined symbols and
the facts to be stated by the unproved propositions; but, when we
begin to formulate the theory, we can imagine that the undefined
symbols are completely devoid of meaning and that the unproved
propositions (instead of stating facts, that is, relations between the
ideas represented by the undefined symbols) are simply conditions
imposed upon undefined symbols.
Then, the system of ideas that we have initially chosen is
simply one interpretation of the system of undefined symbols;
but from the deductive point of view this interpretation can be
ignored by the reader, who is free to replace it in his mind by
another interpretation that satisfies the conditions stated by the
unproved propositions. And since these propositions, from the
deductive point of view, do not state facts, but conditions, we
cannot consider them true postulates. [Padoa 1901, 318; 120-121]
This way of understanding a theory is thus not meant to preserve its
content and express it in a rigorous way, as is the case in the symbolisation
that Peano himself or Frege developed. On the one hand, primitive symbols
are detached from their original meaning and are effectively seen as non-
logical constants, that is, as uninterpreted symbols, whereas on the other hand,
primitive propositions cease to be seen as expressing true facts; they express
the conditions that an interpretation must hold in order to satisfy them.17
17. The fact that Peano and Padoa talk about interpretations and consider
specific domains and interpretations for non-logical symbols does not mean that they
anticipate the contemporary notion of model. On the differences between the notion
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This process entails that the propositions of the formalised theory only
express abstract relations between unspecified objects, properties and rela-
tions. In this sense, the development of a formalised theory (i.e., in Padoa’s
terminology, a deductive theory) involves only a deductive relation between
primitive and derived propositions:
[F]or what is necessary to the logical development of a deductive
theory is not the empirical knowledge of properties of things, but
the formal knowledge of relations between symbols. [Padoa 1901,
319; 121]
The distinction between primitive and derived symbols, and between
axioms and theorems, guarantees that by merely providing an interpretation
of the primitive symbols that satisfies the axioms, the whole theory is
satisfied. All relations between primitive and derived symbols are made
explicit through definitions and, similarly, all theorems are deduced from
axioms and definitions.18
Each of Peano, Padoa and Pieri insist upon putting the notion of
deduction at the centre of their accounts of the formalisation of mathe-
matical theories. However, they never characterise precisely this notion.
In their works, deduction remains an informal notion that is not formally
defined. Peano does offer several specifications of logical principles in his
presentation of the mathematical logic, but all things considered he fails
to provide a full characterisation of the notion of deduction: crucially, a
complete system of inference rules cannot be found in Peano’s presentations
of mathematical logic.19
The hierarchic structure of a mathematical theory proposed by the
members of Peano’s school also involves some methodological principles
that would determine their work on metamathematical questions. Since
a deductive theory is built from a system of primitive propositions and a
system of primitive symbols, the independence of these propositions and the
of interpretation common to Peano and Padoa as opposed to the contemporary notion
of model see [Mancosu, Zach et al. 2009, 323–324].
18. As Blanchette states, the stratification of a mathematical language in terms of
primitive and derived symbols is instrumental to the understanding of reinterpretation
as a method for proving independence, and can be seen as a distinctive feature of
late nineteenth-century approaches to the independence of the axioms of geometry
[Blanchette 2017, 47]. The pioneering work of Peano’s school in this regard should
not be underestimated, especially because of the fact that it predates by a decade
Hilbert’s work on this field.
19. Peano’s metatheoretical questions are, to a great extent, intuitively answered.
Although he does not consider the notion of soundness, his results in metamathemat-
ics presuppose that the calculi he uses are sound. For a discussion on the claim that
Peano does not adopt a fully deductive approach to logic, see [Bertran-San Millán
2020b]. See also [Goldfarb 1980]. For a critical approach to this claim, see [von Plato
2017, 50–57].
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irreducibility of these symbols is understood as a methodological goal. As Pieri
puts in in “Sur la Géométrie envisagée comme un système purement logique”:
As far as possible, primitive ideas should be irreducible to one
another, so that none of them can be explicitly defined by means
of others; and, similarly, the postulates should be independent of
each other, so that none can be deduced from the others. [Pieri
1901, 380, my translation]
It is thus understandable that, right after providing an axiomatisation of
a mathematical theory, Peano studies the independence of their axioms.20
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper I have focused upon the views of Frege and Peano on the
application of logical symbolism and the methods of logic to mathematical
theories, and concluded that they disagreed as regards substantial aspects.
Their varying views on the formalisation of mathematical theories are
rooted in a deep disagreement regarding their goals. For a significant part
of his career, Frege aimed at showing that arithmetic could be reduced
to logic. Before this project was fully articulated and after it had failed,
he intended to use logic as a formal structure appropriate to supplement
the language of arithmetic. Peano never attempted to reduce arithmetic
to logic, but he also devised—independently of Frege—a symbolisation of
mathematical theories with the assistance of logic. However, Peano also aimed
at answering metatheoretical questions such as the independence of the axioms
of a mathematical theory, and he developed an alternative understanding of
symbolised expressions to fulfil this aim.
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